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ABSTRACT 
Purpose. Gas explosion in the underground coal mines of Pakistan is the main source of coal miners’ mortalities. 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the main causes of gas explosion in the underground coal mines of Pakistan. 
Methods. The study employs the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to understand the key root causes that lead to system 
failure. Particularly, this research has articulated the fault tree model in case of gas explosion in underground coal 
mines to analyze the root causes of this dangerous accident. 
Findings. This analysis has revealed that most of the root causes (4/7) with 5/10 accidents, 49/53 fatalities and 28/35 
injuries resulted from primary failure of the gas explosion that poses a major threat to lives of mine workers. Similar-
ly, the accumulation of gases and ignition are leading causes of gas explosion. 
Originality. FTA has been employed for the first time to understand the underlying root causes with the correspon-
ding number of accident, fatalities and injuries of gas explosion in underground coal mines of Pakistan. This original 
application of FTA to the problem under discussion presents some important underlying factors which should be 
considered to reduce the risk of gas explosion and its related fatal and non-fatal accidents. 
Practical implications. The study proposes preventive strategies to lessen the fatal and non-fatal accidents resulting 
from gas explosions. Explicitly, Pakistan has to conduct major structural and safety management reforms. 
Keywords: fault tree analysis, gas explosion, ignition, occupational health and safety, preventive strategies 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Coal mining is considered a dangerous occupation 
amongst all because of its risky and dangerous atmos-
phere (Donoghue, 2004; Sari, Selcuk, Karpuz, & 
Duzgun, 2009; Shahani, Wan, Ali, & Ullah, 2018). 
Accidents have the potential to prompt loss or injury 
and are causes of risk (Liu, Meng, Hassall, & Li, 2016), 
confir-ming the coal mining sector’s safety level of 
production is based upon “Coal-mine safety regula-
tions” (Liu, Li, & Meng, 2019). To cope with the prob-
lem, preventive coal mine strategies are essential to 
launch in order to minimize the ratio of accidents in 
Pakistani coal mines. Taking figures from the past data, 
gas explosions are ranked as the most serious cause of 
accidents in coal mines during production process in 
Pakistan (Shahani et al., 2019). Based on scientific 
investigation, these accidents accounted for 19% of all 
significant coal mine accidents and 17% of casualties as 
shown in Figure 1. 
Coal deposits release significant amounts of methane 
(CH4) gas that is flammable in nature when mixed with 
air in concentrations between 5 and 16% (Brune, Cash-
dollar, & Zipf, 2019). Methane and coal dust are consid-
ered as two important reasons for explosions. Normally, 
methane explosions occur when a buildup of methane 
gas contacts a heat source or if there is not enough air 
and ventilation to dilute the gas level below its explosion 
point. Similarly, fine particles of coal dust in right con-
centration that contact a source of heat could result in 
severe explosion (Niosh, 2012). Thus, coal mine opera-
tors need careful ventilation in underground mine open-
ings to dilute and render harmless concentrations of me-
thane to prevent ignitions and explosions. In this manner, 
gas explosion preventing strategies should be a key con-
cern for improving coal mine safety and minimizing 
accidents. In this study, single time accidents, causalities 
and injuries that occurred in 9 years during 2010 – 2018 
were selected for the purpose of scientific analysis.  
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Figure 1. Classification of accidents and fatalities in (%) from 
2010 – 2018 of major coalfields in Pakistan (Sha-
hani et al., 2019) 
The proper and careful analysis of accidents could 
prevent or lessen the accidents in future and show the 
effect of empirical analysis dealing with accidents, fatali-
ties and injuries that occurred in coal mines in Pakistan. 
The current research literature fails to identify root caus-
es of accidents and offer prevention methods. Similarly, 
accident, fatality and injury analysis seems to be incom-
prehensible or unspecific; therefore, there is a need for 
strengthening preventive strategies to lessen the effect of 
fatal and non-fatal accidents (Xie et al., 2019). To ad-
dress the problem, this paper analyses gas explosions by 
using FTA method to achieve a proper understanding of 
key root causes related to the corresponding number of 
accidents, fatalities and injuries, and to work out effec-
tive prevention strategies to reduce the number of gas 
explosion accidents in coal mines of Pakistan. 
2. HIGHLIGHTS OF COAL MINING 
WORKING CONDITIONS IN PAKISTAN 
Pakistan is the coal-rich industry and is placed top 7th 
around the globe in terms of coal potential (Shahani et 
al., 2019a; Shahani et al., 2019b). Total reserves are 
appro-ximately 200 billion tons, however, due to the lack 
of financial resources and technical skills, no proper 
attention has been given to this particular sector since the 
past many years. 
Presently, the major production of coal is mainly 
achieved by using traditional underground mining me-
thods like longwall and room-and-pillar methods. Addi-
tionally, due to the shortage of technological incapability 
and financial constraints, there is no effective mechaniza-
tion system within Pakistan, and therefore, coal is ex-
tracted manually by using human-work efforts with Pick-
axes. Additionally, excluding few coal mines, animals 
like donkeys are being used for the source of transporta-
tion (haulage) of coal from underground to the surface. 
Keeping in mind safety issues, as compared to other 
countries, Pakistan’s mine management system fails to 
comply with international safety standards; thus, the fatal 
and non-fatal accidents are getting more numerous. Fre-
quent accidents in underground coal mines result from 
accumulation of gases, gas explosion, mine blast, mine 
collapse, falling stone, and so on. Consequently, the 
maximum number of fatal and non-fatal accidents are 
caused by a gas explosion after mine collapse, which is 
the main objective of this paper. Moreover, such circum-
stances increase the scary conditions miners have to 
work in. Therefore, Pakistan has to take major structural 
and safety management reforms like “the application of 
engineering design, adoption of effective technology, 
administration of safety laws, and additional efforts to 
workforce education related to safety as a prerequisite” 
(Jiskani et al., 2019). Figure 2 shows the location of the 
significant coalfields in Pakistan. 
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Figure 3 denotes the highlights of coal mine working 
conditions in Pakistan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Highlights of coal mine working conditions in 
Pakistan (Sim, 2014; IndustriALL, 2015) 
3. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is regarded as one of cru-
cial symbolic, logic, and analytical techniques among 
various scientific techniques. It was first used in aero-
space industry, but its usage has been transferred on to 
different other industries, like nuclear industry, offshore 
chemical (Yuhua & Datao, 2005), and mining (Zhang, 
Kecojevic, & Komljenovic, 2014) industries since 1979 
(Lavasani, Wang, Yang, & Finlay, 2011). 
It is a system analysis technique for determining the 
root causes and the probability of a specified undesired 
event occurrence. Many authors or organizations have 
described the method in literature (NASA, 2002; Ericson, 
2005; IEC, 2006; Oakley, 2012; Harms-Ringdahl, 2013). 
Figure 4 shows the initial 5 stages comprising the FTA’s 
problem development. The other 3 stages cover the FT 
construction, its assessment, and lastly the explanation of FT 
outcomes. Though almost all stages are accomplished suc-
cessively, stages 3 to 5 could be carried on simultaneously.  
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Figure 4. General procedure for the fault tree analysis 
(NASA, 2002) 
Stage 4 and stage 5 could be changed in the course by 
stage 6 and stage 7. There are 3 key models proposed 
(Ericson, 2005), but this study practices the State-of-
Component (SC) model, which continues seeking the 
primary (P), secondary (S) and command (C) failure root 
causes of the incident respectively. 
For example, “an electric motor fails to work” is a 
primary failure, and the primary failure is considered as an 
integral part of the system component. An electric motor 
fails to work because of other sources (i.e. no power to an 
electric motor) which means it is a secondary failure. “A 
command failure” is a predictable, or anticipated incident 
that follows during an undesirable period because of iden-
tified failure.” (Ericson, 2005). “A command failure is 
such a failure in the missile arm and fire functions which 
launches the missile before the usual time”. 
4. METHODS 
The methodological approach towards achieving the 
objectives of this study is an empirical analysis of the 
underground coal mines gas explosion based on data 
from 2010 to 2018. The multiple data collection methods 
were used (IndustriALL, 2016; IndustriALL, 2017; In-
dustriALL, 2018) to identify the exact number of acci-
dents with related fatalities and injuries caused by these 
accidents. Next, the FTA analysis of gas explosion in 
underground coal mines is studied both qualitatively and 
quantitatively for better understanding of the primary 
root causes of accidents. Finally, some prevention strate-
gies are also put forward to address the subject matter. 
5. RESULT ANALYSIS 
Based on the collected data from 2010 to 2018, the 
underground coal mine gas explosion accidents, fatali-
ties and injuries were statistically analysed and studied. 
As shown in Figure 5, a total number of 11 accidents 
caused 53 deaths and 35 injuries from 2010 to 2018 in 
Pakistan. An average of ~1 gas explosion accident hap-
pened every year. 
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Figure 5. Underground coal mine gas explosion accidents, 
fatalities and injuries from 2010 – 2018 
Similarly, the average of ~5 deaths and ~3 injuries 
counted by each accident per year. This clearly shows 
that the number of fatalities and injuries is increasing 
with the increasing number of accidents. Figure 6 de-
notes the causes for accidents, fatalities and injuries. 
Thus, the major causes of fatal and non-fatal accidents in 
coal mines of Pakistan are: accumulation of gas (5/10 
accidents, 49/53 fatalities and 28/35 injuries) and ignition 
sources (5/10 accidents, 4/53 fatalities and 7/35 injuries). 
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Figure 6. Cause-wise number of accidents, fatalities and injuries 
5.1. Fault tree 
This study focuses on primary and some common 
causes of gas explosions in underground coal mines in 
Pakistan. As Fault tree analysis gives an exact picture of 
the total number of accidents which happened during the 
said period, it was essential to go through FTA analysis 
for better understanding the nature of the problem. This 
study uses the FTA method to analyze the causes of gas 
explosion in coal mining and measures for its prevention. 
The diagram of gas explosion fault tree was constructed 
based on the primary (P), secondary (S), and command 
(C) causes of the event as shown in Figure 7. The root 
causes (i.e. the basic events in the FT) were constructed 
based on the current working conditions and methodolo-
gy in coal mines of Pakistan. Table 1 shows elimination 
of gas explosion root causes. 
Table 2 shows the primary, secondary and command 
root causes along with a relative number of accidents, 
fatalities and injuries that must be eliminated or should 
be adequately controlled to ensure the safe working con-
ditions for coal miners. Consequently, the highest num-
ber of root causes (4/7) was contributed by the primary 
root cause and it resulted in 5/10 accidents, 49/53 fatali-
ties and 28/35 injuries. Similarly, the total number of 
secondary and command root causes are 2/7 and 1/7 with 
3/10 accidents, 2/53 fatalities and 2/35 injuries; 2/10 
accidents, 2/53 fatalities and 5/35 injuries respectively.  
All these root causes could be mitigated by adequate 
design of mines, regular mines inspection, compliance 
with the suggested mine safety rules and regulations, etc.  
In detail, related safety measures are discussed in the 
conclusion and preventive strategies section. 
6. CONCLUSION AND 
PREVENTION STRATEGIES 
Mining work remains dangerous in many countries 
despite improvements in occupational health and safety 
during current years. Safety development policies and 
strategies must be a part of global risk mitigation. Oth-
erwise, it will add to the loss of lives of many workers 
throughout the world. FTA is one of the approaches 
used to correctly diagnose the root causes of accidents 
and therefore, to avoid the incidence of such accidents 
in the future. Gas explosion accidents are ranked as the 
biggest disasters after mine collapse accidents in coal 
mines of Pakistan.  
Findings of this research indicate that major root 
causes are related to gas explosion. Moreover, to prevent 
such gas explosion (methane gas and coal dust explo-
sions) accidents, various approaches could be employed. 
“The basic remedial strategies are to prevent the exist-
ence and accumulation of combustible bodies of methane 
and to eradicate sources of ignition like exposed fires, 
frictional and electrical flashes, heat from spontaneously 
combusting coal and heat from mining equipment com-
prising, nonetheless not restricted to hot exhaust mani-
folds and frictional heat (belts, brakes)”. Based on this 
study, the following sections confer these options in 
detail to address the gas explosion accidents for the well-
being of coal mine workers not only in Pakistan but also 
in coal mines of other countries. 
6.1. Adequate supply of ventilation 
Preventing the buildup of combustible gases is gen-
erally accomplished through proper techniques like 
sufficient amount of ventilation in all mine passways 
and the discharge of methane (CH4) from the coalbed 
earlier to and during the mining operation. The system 
of the mine ventilation should be carefully designed so 
that all mine passways must be adequately ventilated 
with sufficient quantities of air to reduce accumulations 
of CH4 in intake air paths to less than or equal to 1% 
(Unites States Code of Federal Regulations, 2019). If 
higher concentrations of CH4 are identified in intake air 
paths, all the motor-powered equipment must be pow-
ered off, and the control of ventilation should also be 
adjusted so that concentration of CH4 lessens to 1% 
(Kissell, 2006). 
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Table 1. Gas explosion root causes that could be eliminated 
Root causes Primary failure (P) 
Secondary 
failure (S) 
Command 
fault (C) Solution Solution sorts 
X1 & X3 √   Design Installation of extra fans for an adequate supply of ventilation 
X4 √   Best practices Improvement in technological skills and awareness regarding safety
X5 √   Design Availability of latest safety devices and equipment 
X2   √ Best practices Visual examinations, maintenance, and  operating measures 
X6 & X7  √  Proper control Suppress the sources of ignition 
Table 2. Gas explosion root causes that could be eliminated 
Item Primary Secondary Command Total 
Root causes 4 2 1 7 
Accidents 5 3 2 10 
Fatalities 49 2 2 53 
Injuries 28 2 5 35 
 
A substantial level of safety under the “lower flam-
mable limit 5%” should be ensured to safeguard coal 
mine workers from CH4 explosions. 
All operational places of the mine (the areas where 
miners work) must be checked regularly for the appro-
priate ventilation within a few hours before work.  In 
addition to that, all other working zones should be exam-
ined minimum once or twice a week for the amount of 
ventilation and any accumulations of CH4 at particular 
investigation marks. 
Mined out areas or goaf area of the mine must be 
closed by the explosion-proof barricades from all access-
es guiding to this zone. After this area is closed, it will be 
no longer ventilated and CH4 could be indorsed to store 
inside the restricted zone. 
At present, new principles are successfully imple-
mented (Zipf, Sapko, & Brune, 2007). They demand 
building the explosion-proof barricades with a minimum 
pressure of 50 psi and efficient examination of the envi-
ronment beyond such barricades. 
6.2. Proper drainage of methane gas 
By supplying fresh air to ventilate the mine entrances, 
CH4 concentration is reduced, which ensures its drainage 
from working coalbed and adjacent coalbeds above or 
below active seams. Additionally, methane discharge 
should be carried out before mining through drilling 
boreholes into the coal from nearby mine passways. 
Draining CH4 from mined out areas that are greatly 
cracked after the coal has been mined (particularly by a 
longwall method) can be an effective technique to avoid 
CH4 release from coalbeds situated above the coal ex-
tracted in operational areas. 
6.3. Prevention of ignitable matter accumulation 
To prevent the development of ignitable coal haze, 
rock or pulverized particles of limestone, it is recom-
mended to spray above the “coal dust” generated in the 
course of mining in mine accesses to develop an inert 
dust combination. To reduce the concentration of such 
coal dust and make it adequately inert, as stated by the 
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proposed rules, fine limestone particles should be mixed 
with coal dust in such a way that there should be at least 
65% of noninflammable substance in all intake entrances 
and 80% of noninflammable substances in return air 
routes (Nagy, 1981). The noninflammable substance 
contains coal moisture and ash, additional fine particles 
of rock, and any other inert mine dust (like shale in the 
roof or floor rock of mine). The added limestone dust is 
essential to permit about 70% through a 200-mesh or 
75μm screen. A greater noninflammable content is essen-
tial in return air passages since the dust of coal transport-
ed through the supply of ventilation is supposed to be 
pulverized in size. “This “float coal dust” is defined as 
dust that permits a 200-mesh (75 μm) sieve”. 
Water sprays are the best option to reduce the produc-
tion of “float coal dust” and transfer it into the ventilation 
during mining and carrying of coal. All operational 
equipment in mine is usually armed with water sprays. 
However, this equipment typically is placed next to cut-
ting drums, crushers and conveyor transfer points. 
The limestone rock dust behaves as a “heat sink” 
(heat sink is a device or material absorbing the extreme 
quantity of heat), and the prevention of coal-dust explo-
sion is only achieved through the sufficient quantity of 
rock dust added to the coal-dust (Nagy, 1981). It should 
be spread in the all mining passages by air-filled spray 
rags along with trickle rags, which are practiced in the 
return entrances of longwall and continuous miner units. 
It is essential that mine inspectors and operators 
should inspect and notice the quality of “inertization” in 
the course of all ventilation investigations on the constant 
basis to make sure that proper quantities of rock dust are 
available. The presently established “Coal Dust Explo-
sibility Meter” (Sapko & Verakis, 2006) allows prompt 
calculation of the acceptability of rock dust application 
by an optical reflectivity analysis. Finally, the misuse of 
the ignitable matter is also a big problem, so it is recom-
mended to avoid such mishandling of all combustible 
matters during mining operations. 
6.4. Suppression of the potential sources of ignition 
One more practice for protection against gas explo-
sions is to suppress all potential ignition sources. All ma-
chinery or equipment, which is used for underground coal 
extraction must be acceptable by safety-related standards 
for safe coal production. Usually, the approved powered 
equipment is supplied by explosion-resistant enclosures, 
which averts the CH4 ignition sources inside the powered 
motors from igniting a combustible CH4 surrounding exte-
rior. Additionally, the equipment (like continuous miners 
and longwall shearers) used in coal mines for the extrac-
tion of coal is supplied with CH4 monitors, which are regu-
lated to alarm the person responsible for the equipment if 
the concentrations of CH4 rise over 1%. When the concen-
tration of CH4 exceeds 1.5%, all the electrical equipment 
must be powered off at all electrical sources. 
The diesel engines powered equipment must be ap-
proved through suggested mining codes concerning “the 
surface temperature, exhaust gas temperature and exhaust 
gas quality” to be considered permitted in coal mines 
(Nagy, 1981). 
The flames and smoking should be strictly prevented 
in underground coal mines. Though, whenever it be-
comes compulsory to work under flame during welding 
and cutting actions, special safety measures should be 
carried to avoid CH4 explosions. These safety measures 
suppose observing the working atmosphere through  
recognized mine investigator at the welding areas for the 
occurrence of CH4. 
The permissible explosives should be practiced for 
mining operation whenever necessary, which must be 
approved by associated mining safety supervisory. There-
fore, the permissible explosives are usually used without 
the risk of exploding a combustible CH4 environment. 
6.5. Prevention of gas explosions through 
equipment and safety supervision 
Working conditions at the majority of Pakistan’s coal 
mines are very poor, the level of overall production tech-
nology is low, adding to this – poor equipment, outdated 
mining approaches, and the dearth of sufficient safety 
security in coal mines. The associated authorities should 
contribute to the positively safe working environment to 
ensure the safety of coal mine workers. Simultaneously, 
the safety mechanism within organizations should be 
evaluated on a regular basis, and the prevention mecha-
nism of coal mine gas explosions through latest techno-
logical equipment should be ensured. The organization 
should invest more into security and safety of mine work-
ers and meet the law standards specified by the state. 
6.6. Prevention of gas explosions 
through latest technological research 
Education linked to the mechanism of gas explosion 
should be further reinforced, the research on gas explo-
sions enhancing expertise must be strengthened, the 
disaster alert should be referred to the related units and 
hazardous circumstances. Miners should be informed in 
accordance with the rules prior to the occurrence of gas 
explosion accident. Simultaneously, the obstacle to new 
technological research into gas explosions related acci-
dents should be reinforced to decline the level of disas-
ters in the coal mines of Pakistan. 
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АНАЛІЗ ДЕРЕВА ВІДМОВ І СТРАТЕГІЇ ЗАПОБІГАННЯ ВИБУХІВ 
ГАЗУ В ПІДЗЕМНИХ ВУГІЛЬНИХ ШАХТАХ ПАКИСТАНУ 
Н.М. Шахані, М.Дж. Саджід, X. Чженг, І.М. Джіскані, М.А. Брохі, М. Алі, Б. Уллах, А.Р. Куреші 
Мета. Аналіз впливу основних факторів, що викликають вибухи шахтного газу метану, на основі складання 
моделі дерева відмов в умовах вугільних шахт Пакистану. 
Методика. Для досягнення мети дослідження застосовано емпіричний аналіз вибухів газу у вугільних шах-
тах Пакистану на основі даних з 2010 по 2018 роки для визначення точного числа аварій зі смертельними випа-
дками і травмами. Аналіз вибухів газу вивчався як якісно, так і кількісно для кращого розуміння першопричин, 
що створюють небезпечні аварійні ситуації на підставі аналізу дерева відмов (АДВ). 
Результати. Встановлено, що 11 нещасних випадків привели до 53 смертельних випадків і 35 травм у період 
з 2010 по 2018 роки у Пакистані. Значна частина причин (4 з 7), що призвели до 5 з 10 нещасних випадків, 49 з 
53 смертей та 28 з 35 травм, була пов’язана з вибухом газу, а основні фактори, що викликають вибух – це нако-
пичення газу і його загоряння. Акцентовано увагу на належну якість проектування шахт, регулярний огляд 
шахт, дотримання пропонованих правил і норм безпеки. 
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Наукова новизна. Метод АДВ було вперше застосовано для розуміння глибинних причин, що викликають 
вибух газу у вугільних шахтах Пакистану, а його специфікація дозволила виявити ряд важливих ключових фак-
торів, які слід враховувати для зменшення ризику вибуху газу й запобігання викликаних ним аварій. 
Практична значимість. Розроблено стратегічні заходи, що дозволяють запобігти або зменшити число ава-
рій зі смертельними наслідками (або без них), викликаних вибухом газу. Для цієї мети пропонується, аби в 
Пакистані були проведені серйозні структурні реформи і перетворення в галузі охорони праці. 
Ключові слова: аналіз дерева відмов, вибух газу, займання, професійне здоров’я і охорона праці, стратегії 
запобігання аварій 
АНАЛИЗ ДЕРЕВА ОТКАЗОВ И СТРАТЕГИИ ПРЕДОТВРАЩЕНИЯ  
ВЗРЫВОВ ГАЗА В ПОДЗЕМНЫХ УГОЛЬНЫХ ШАХТАХ ПАКИСТАНА 
Н.М. Шахани, М.Дж. Саджид, X. Чженг, И.М. Джискани, М.А. Брохи, М. Али, Б. Уллах, А.Р. Куреши 
Цель. Анализ влияния основных факторов, вызывающих взрывы шахтного газа метана на основе составле-
ния модели дерева отказов в условиях угольных шахт Пакистана. 
Методика. Для достижения цели исследования применен эмпирический анализ взрывов газа в угольных шах-
тах Пакистана на основе данных с 2010 по 2018 годы для определения точного числа аварий со смертельными 
случаями и травмами. Анализ взрывов газа изучался как качественно, так и количественно для лучшего понима-
ния первопричин, которые создают опасные аварийные ситуации на основании анализа дерева отказов (АДО). 
Результаты. Установлено, что 11 несчастных случаев привели к 53 смертельным случаям и 35 травмам в 
период с 2010 по 2018 годы в Пакистане. Значительная часть причин (4 из 7), приведших к 5 из 10 несчастных 
случаев, 49 из 53 смертей и 28 из 35 травм, была связана со взрывом газа, а основные факторы, вызывающие 
взрыв – это накопление газа и его возгорание. Акцентировано внимание на надлежащее качество проектирова-
ния шахт, регулярный осмотр шахт, соблюдение предлагаемых правил и норм безопасности шахт. 
Научная новизна. Метод АДО был впервые применен впервые для понимания глубинных причин, вызываю-
щих взрыв газа в угольных шахтах Пакистана, а его спецификация позволила выявить ряд важных ключевых фак-
торов, которые следует учитывать для сокращения риска взрыва газа и предотвращения вызванных им аварий. 
Практическая значимость. Разработаны стратегические меры, позволяющие предотвратить или уменьшить 
число аварий со смертельными последствиями (или без них), вызванных взрывом газа. Для этой цели предлагается, 
чтобы в Пакистане были проведены серьезные структурные реформы и преобразования в области охраны труда. 
Ключевые слова: анализ дерева отказов, взрыв газа, воспламенение, профессиональное здоровье и охрана 
труда, стратегии предотвращения аварий 
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